Existing research on international regime formation concentrates heavily on explaining bargaining processes and their outcomes, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of international regimes. With very few exceptions, variation in ratification behavior, an important component of international regime formation, has not been studied in detail. We draw on conventional theories of international cooperation and on the policy-diffusion literature to shed light on the driving forces of ratification behavior. Our focus is on international efforts to reduce long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe (LRTAP agreements). Specifically, we examine the relative importance of international diffusion mechanisms vis-à-vis unit-internal factors, such as net pollution exports, income, trade openness, democracy, and so on. Our preliminary results suggest that, controlling for a wide range of other influences, policy-diffusion effects are an important driving force of ratification behavior.
Introduction
International treaties are a key element of most efforts to solve security, environmental, economic or social problems that extend beyond national boundaries. While the study of bargaining processes that lead to formal international agreements is obviously important, events that unfold after negotiations have been concluded are very important for international regime formation too. To become effective in legal terms, international treaties generally require not only signing, but also ratification. While ratification per se does not imply that a treaty will be effective in changing behavior in ways that solve the problem of concern, it is usually a necessary condition for problem solving.
Existing research concentrates heavily on explaining international bargaining processes and their outcomes, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of international agreements.
With very few exceptions variation in ratification behavior has not been studied in detail.
While ratification behavior of countries is important from a policy perspective, it also raises interesting analytical questions.
A naive version of the two level game logic might assume that negotiators are faithful and fully informed agents of their respective government, and that governments have full information on what kinds of international bargains will be acceptable to the parliament or the median voter -the standard assumption is that pareto-improving agreements are acceptable. If this interpretation were empirically useful and if the relative gains problem could be ignored we would observe that most treaties in whose negotiation a given country participated would be ratified without much delay by that country (e.g. Hovi, Sprinz, Bang 2008 , Fearon 1998 , Downs, Rocke, Barsoom 1996 , see also Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse 2007) .
In reality, there is great variation in ratification behavior in virtually all areas of international affairs. That is, some countries ratify a given treaty earlier than others, and some countries do not ratify at all. Besides various idiosyncratic factors (e.g. a change of government) there are at least two main sources of variation: domestic and international. In this paper we are interested in the importance of international relative to domestic determinants of ratification behavior. Domestic factors are essentially country characteristics, such as features of political institutions or socio-economic conditions. International factors capture linkages of a given country with the international system as a whole and single units (countries) in that system.
Of particular interest in this paper is the assumption that the ratification behavior of a country is possibly affected by the ratification behavior of other countries.
Explaining ratification behavior along these lines is reminiscent of what Galton postulated in his criticism of Tylor's work on institutions of marriage (Stocking 1968) .
1 Translated to international treaty ratification, Galton's problem can be formulated as follows: if we observe that two countries exhibit similar or identical ratification behavior with respect to a given international treaty, this could be due to a common external stimulus, similar domestic characteristics, or interdependent behavior of the two countries. To what extent can ratification behavior be viewed through the lens of policy diffusion analysis? The typical analytical setup in policy diffusion research is to pick a policy area (e.g.
anti-smoking or social policy) and to account for policy-variation across units on the basis of variables that capture unit characteristics and variables that capture the behavior of other units in the policy area of interest. The latter variables -usually called policy diffusion variablesare often measured in terms of how all other units combined behave. Or, to capture policy diffusion mechanisms (e.g., learning, competition, emulation, coercion; see e.g. Shipan and Volden 2008) in greater detail, they are measured in terms of how specific groups or individual other countries behave.
The circumstances of treaty ratification differ from the typical circumstances analyzed in policy diffusion research. In cases such as anti-smoking or social policies, political units respond to a given social problem in various ways, driven by unit-internal and -external conditions. The main analytical difference between international treaty ratification and, say, 1 Galton questioned the independency assumption of the selected cases and argued that cultural similarities could be due to evolutionary development, but also due to common descent and borrowing (cultural diffusion).
2 The assumption is often that interdependent behavior of countries is primarily relevant in the bargaining phase, because countries interact very directly there (Koremenos et al. 2004; ) .
3 See Allendoerfer and von , Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006 , Neumayer 2008 , Simmons 2009 Vreeland 2008 , von Stein 2007 , Abbott and Snidal 2000 , Pevehouse 2005 , Hathaway 2007 , Moravcsik 2000 , Simmons 2009 , Büthe and Milner 2008 , Neumayer and Spess 2005 , Lipson 1991 , Morrow 2007 , Milner 1997 , Odell 2000 anti-smoking policies of US cities or German Bundeslaender is that the units do not explicitly and formally coordinate policies prior to deciding on whether to put the respective domestic policies in place and implement them. In the international treaty ratification case, countries negotiate formal legal provisions. Once all or a subset of negotiators agree on these rules the treaty is opened for signature and ratification. Compared to uncoordinated policy diffusion settings, that is, settings without prior collective bargaining and agreement on specific legal provisions, coordinated settings are likely to be associated with a narrower range of choices for countries and, by implication also ambition levels if international bargaining produces lowest-common denominator provisions. However, this difference between uncoordinated and coordinated policy settings does not rule out a policy diffusion perspective on treaty ratification. It is quite common that countries over-comply or under-comply with international treaties, or that international rules provide for tailor-made rights and obligations for specific groups of countries or individual countries. Thus we conclude that ratification behavior can be treated analytically in the typical policy diffusion framework; that is, with unit-internal and unit-external variables explaining policy choices.
In this paper we develop a set of hypotheses pertaining to unit-internal and -external driving forces of international treaty ratification. Empirically, we concentrate on international agreements against long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP). The LRTAP agreements are widely heralded as important achievements in effort to reduce air pollution in Europe (e.g., Di Primio 1998:298) . There is great variation, both over time and between treaties, in the extent to which countries have participated in the cooperative process. These agreements offer an interesting testing ground for our hypotheses. If we assume that principal-agent problems in negotiating these agreements exists and ratification, which brings countries closer to implementation, is costly we should expect that domestic ratification processes in any given political unit are not taking place in isolation. Rather, ratification behavior by any given country is likely to be influenced by the ratification behavior of other countries. Concluding a treaty can be regarded as a re-orientation from the national to the international realm (see Jahn 2006) . Hitherto national environmental policies are coordinated or even harmonized through international bargaining and regime formation. In most cases, including the international LRTAP regime, such efforts aim at reducing externalities that cross international borders, establishing an economic level playing field by distributing burdens in a way that do not increase production cost differentials across countries, or at facilitating the spread of best available practices and technologies.
This paper reports on work in progress. The focus is on assessing the empirical relevance of country-external vis-à-vis country-internal driving forces of treaty ratification. We conceptualize external factors in terms of learning, emulation and competition effects. The empirical analysis concentrates on nine LRTAP agreements and ratification behavior of European countries with respect to these agreements.
Literature Review
Existing studies of international environmental commitments offer a useful starting point for In this paper, we refer to processes that lead countries to voluntarily make similar policy choices as their "peers" as "international policy diffusion". We agree with Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett ( Volden (2008) in their study of antismoking policies in U.S. cities propose four similar mechanisms: coercion, competition, learning and emulation, while Simmons and Elkins (2004) , for example, distinguish two broadly defined mechanisms, which fostered the diffusion of economic liberalism: diffusion as adaptation to altered conditions, and diffusion as a learning-process. Adaptation to altered conditions means that foreign policy choices can alter the (material or reputational) payoffs associated with choosing or maintaining a particular policy. Here, the process of policy change is a strategic adaptation and/or a necessity. In contrast, learning processes imply that foreign policy choices can change the information set on which governments base their own policy decisions.
The existing literature shows very clearly that it has been much easier to come up with theoretical concepts for diffusion mechanisms than to establish their empirical relevance, and their relative importance in particular, through large-N studies.
Model description and main hypotheses
As we have already mentioned above, treaty ratification might not only be explained by domestic factors but can also be strongly influenced through the interdependent behavior of countries. That is why we do not only take into account countries' internal factors like potential adaptation cost, institutional patterns or capacities, which have already been shown to have an influence on the ratification behavior of international environmental treaties in our model but we also add country-external factor in order to catch potential international diffusion effects. Indeed, we do not consider countries as purely independent actors. We postulate that the policy decision of other countries or some other countries can foster ratification dynamics through international diffusion process. The mechanisms, which can lead to this international diffusion process may be learning, emulation or competition effects. accession. By implication we should not assume that mitigation cost and benefit differences across countries are fully internalized in the design of a treaty. If this were the case, we should not expect differences in mitigation costs and benefits to have much impact on variation in ratification behavior.
In the first hypothesis, we postulate that the more countries have ratified, the bigger the opportunity to learn, what therefore positively influence the probability for a country to ratify.
Decision makers might be influenced by the behavior of others, as they are generally not perfectly informed when they have to decide to ratify or not. Therefore, what other countries do, gives important information that a country might learn from. This may subsequently change the beliefs of policy-makers. Indeed, a broad adoption over time may be interpreted as a success or evidence of political support and convinces governments to act similarly.
H1: The probability of treaty ratification by a given country increases
with the number of other countries that have ratified this treaty.
Concretely, a learning mechanism is at work, when a government takes into account new knowledge available from abroad in its evaluation of a given policy practice or behavior. And those new considerations induce a change in the beliefs of policymakers regarding the effectiveness and/ or usefulness of this given behavior (Braun et al. 2008 International diffusion processes can also be fostered through emulation mechanisms. A mechanism of emulation is present if a country copies a practice from abroad not primarily to solve a given problem, but in order to gain credibility or legitimacy on the international level.
By that governments try to signal "their alignment to socially valued policy-making models" (Brown et al., 2008: 8) . Following this idea, the behavior of participatory countries not only affects the exposure to new information, but can also modify the beliefs about the relevance and value of a given behavior. The more powerful countries cooperate in the LRTAP regime, the more valuable the ratification of an LRTAP-agreement may be considered. In this case, former non-participatory countries may expect additional benefits, e.g. international credibility, from ratifying an LRTAP-agreement and will therefore enter into the agreement.
For example, according to Lewanski (2000: 273) , Italy ratified the Sofia Protocol (NOx) and the VOC Protocol despite the high costs related to those agreements neither for ecological reasons nor due to economic pressure, but primarily in order not to 'loose face'. Thus, reputational considerations were at work. Following this, we postulate that the attitude of especially powerful countries influence the ratification behavior from others through emulation.
H3: The probability of treaty ratification by a given country is higher when powerful other countries have ratified this treaty.
Finally, the international environmental politics literature has dealt quite extensively with trading-up and race-to-the-bottom arguments (Vogel 2005 , Drezner 2001 Institutional aspects also matter. Especially, the feasibility of political change: in our case ratification. This idea lies at the heart of Tsebelis' veto player approach (Tsebelis 2002) . Veto points are political institutions that intervene between policy demands and decisions. The less veto points a given political system has, the more concentrated the allocation of power and the easier it is to change the status quo by signing an international agreement on the reduction of emissions in order to increase air quality. We further control for affiliation to the European Union. Since the late nineties, directives regarding several aspects of air pollution have been amended, 5 which may lower the entrance costs into LRTAP agreements.
In addition, it is necessary to control mitigation costs and benefits. Nations, which produce externalities by exporting more air pollution than they import, have higher incentives not to participate in LRTAP treaties aiming to mitigate negative externalities of air pollutants.
Finally, we include treaty-variables in the model to take into account the differences between the agreements regarding their content and their level of commitment demanded by their members and we control the time dimension as we analyze a dynamic model. 
Dataset and Statistical Approach
We test the hypotheses discussed above using a new panel dataset that includes information on all nine LRTAP-agreements and all countries that ratified the 1979 LRTAP-Convention located on the Eurasian continent. 6 The USA and Canada are not geographically contiguous with the other countries and, therefore, are not part of the same transboundary pollution problem. 7 The source of our data for the dependent variable (treaty ratification) is the LRTAP secretariat. Data for the explanatory variables is taken from the sources described in Table 1 .
We restrict the analysis to the time period 1979 to 2007 because data for many explanatory variables is not available for very recent years.
The unit of analysis is the treaty-country dyad per year. Each of the nine treaties is paired with each of the 47 countries, and those treaty-country pairs are connected to a times-series that starts in the year when the treaty was opened for ratification. Each treaty-country pair then stays in the dataset until the year when the respective country ratified the treaty. The dependent variable for a given treaty-country pair in a given year takes the value zero if the country did not ratify the treaty in that year, and one if it ratified.
We apply the binary-time-series-cross-sectional (BTSCS) approach described in Carter/Signorino (2007) , which is largely similar to the technique described in Beck et al.
(1998) to test our hypotheses. As time-series data are temporally related, we need a method to deal with the time dependence problem of BTSCS analysis, which may biase the results of the analysis. Carter/Signorino (2007) as well as Beck et al. (1998) treat binary-time-series-crosssectional data as grouped duration data where the interval of observing the data is fixed to one year. That is why a given treaty-country pair is dropped from the dataset after ratification took place (after the value of the dependent variable changed from zero to one). Although the standard approach is to include splines or time dummies, we will include the time (age of treaty) as well as its squared and cubic as additional terms in the regression to model time dependencies. This technique should be preferred because it allows to avoid the problems connected with the use of time dummies (inefficiency, quasi complete separation issues), and experimental and empirical evidence suggest that it performs as well or better as splines by increasing, decreasing and non-monotonic hazard (Carter/Signorino 2007: 18ff) . To crossexamine the robustness of our results we will also use conditional logit models, which allow controlling for fixed effects.
Operationalisation
For the purpose of the operationalisation of interdependent behavior, we developed several indicators. We use the lagged share of other countries that have ratified (Others), respectively the percent of all signatory countries of the convention that have ratified a given treaty the year before, as a rough general measure of the ratification behavior of all other countries taken as a whole (H1.1.).
However, one may argue that the opportunities to learn and to be influenced by others should Regarding our third hypothesis, to operationalize the behavior of the most powerful countries among the signatory parties of the convention, we create a dummy variable (Big_3) that measures if the United Kingdom, France and Germany have all ratified or not.
Finally, we developed an indicator, which allows us to measure the impact of the ratification behavior of the most important competitors (H4): the share of the 5 biggest trade partners, which did not yet ratified the treaty (Competitors). The most accurate way to operationalize the concept of competitor with respect to countries as a whole and not only by sectors is still subject of academic debate (see Cao/Prakash, forthcoming). But it is widely recognized that in embedded western economies, the bigger and the broader the exchanges between countries are, the more their domestic economic actors compete with each other. For this reason, we use the five most important trade partners as main competitors. For each country we added export and import to each other country in constant USD and selected for each year the five with the highest value of exchanged commodity goods.
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The control variables are operationlized as following: For country size we use the total of the population, logged (pop), the economic power is measured with the GDP, logged (gdp) and country income with GDP per capita, logged (gdppc). We also include the degree of trade openness, 10 a measure estimating the feasibility of policy change 11 and the country's status towards the EU.
To catch the costs and benefits of a transboundary air pollution reduction, we include the emission-deposition ratio of transboundary pollution of each country in the model, too. A small ratio means that the country is merely a victim of transboundary pollution, while a bigger ratio implies that the country exports more transboundary pollution abroad than it suffers from.
We take into account variation between the nine LRTAP agreements by including treaty dummies to consider the different features and contents of the treaties and control the time effect. As explained below (p. 12), we model the time dynamics explicitly, including the age of the treaty as well as its squared and cubic term (t, t2, t3) . We also test for potential structural shift with a post cold war dummy. 
Empirical results
In the baseline model, all variables are significant except income and political constraints, which we nevertheless let in the model for theoretical reasons. As expected, the measure of transboundary polluter is a strong and significant predictor and shows that cost/benefitthoughts definitely drive the ratification behaviors of countries. Polluter countries are clearly more reluctant to ratify agreements that aim to reduce air pollution, while victims of transboundary pollution ratify faster.
However The ratification of Germany, France and UK significantly influences the likelihood of other countries to ratify (H2, Big_3), which here suggests an emulation effect. Governments may try to signal their alignment to socially valued policy-making models by imitating larger or wealthier leaders.
Regarding our third hypothesis, we observe that interdependent effects can not only foster but also hinder ratification dynamics. The results clearly show, everything else being equal, that the choice of competitors matters. If they have not ratified a given treaty, the probability a country will ratify it decreases. As we discussed it above, clean air policies are costly and their implementation may harm the competitiveness of some economic sectors. Consequently, it is to expect that a country carefully looks at its direct competitors' behavior before it commits to abating its emissions, that is connected with extensive economic costs.
( Fig.2) Finally, we see that the treaty dummies are in most models significant, what confirms that the effects of the agreements significantly differs. 13 The more advanced and demanding an agreement is, the less likely the probability of this treaty to be ratified in the next year.
Obviously, countries tend to prefer cooperative commitments, which are not too costly.
The inclusion of different variables catching time dependence shows that time matters and has a non-linear effect. The dummy aiming at controlling for a potential structural shift after the end of the cold war was withdrawn from the model, because no significant shift happened after 1989 regarding the development of the LRTAP regime. The same holds for the affiliation to the European Union, which neither improves the model nor have any significant effect.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that international diffusion variables influence ratification dynamic of regime above and beyond unit-internal determinants. Economical factors and cost/benefits thoughts are definitely important predictors of international environmental commitment, but do not explain the whole story. However, the effect of the behavior of others is not at all constant. Diffusion effects are observed where relevant others have already ratified, like big and powerful countries or competitors. 
